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ABSTRACT
Islamic banks are banks that are set up to operate within the Islamic business framework that is more equitable and 
based on socio-economic welfare of the society and the people. In Islamic law on commercial transactions and other 
related contractual activities (the framework), transparency and adequate disclosure are the fundamental determinants 
of a successful and peaceful relationship between the contracting parties. This is because the stakeholders of Islamic 
banks believed that the prescriptions of the framework would be the key determinants of the bank’s Ethical Identity 
Disclosures (EID). This study aimed at exploring and identifying the practical determinants of EID in Islamic banks. 
Disclosure information in annual reports (from 2007 to 2011) of 21 Islamic banks operating in Bahrain and Malaysia 
was gathered and analysed using Ethical Identity Index (EII) and Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) models. The 
results of EII and MRA on nine ethical disclosure dimensions consisting of 80 constructs and 4 assumed determinants 
of EID among Islamic banks indicated that EID of both countries is low and that independent directors do not affect 
the level of social disclosure. However, board size, Shari’ah supervisory Board and investment account holders can 
significantly influence the disclosure level in Islamic banks. Hence, we conclude that our findings are in conflict with 
main theories such as agency theory, however supports institutional theory.
Keywords: Ethical identity disclosure; determinants; Islamic Banks; Bahrain; Malaysia
ABSTRAK
Kajian ini bertujuan untuk meneroka dan mengenalpasti penentu-penentu yang praktikal berkaitan Etika Pendedahan 
Identiti (EID) di bank-bank Islam. Laporan tahunan bagi tempoh 5 tahun (2007-2011) bagi 21 bank-bank Islam yang 
beroperasi di Bahrain dan Malaysia, telah dikumpulkan dan dianalisa. Kajian menggunakan Indeks Etika Pengenalan 
(EII) dan model Analisa Regresi Berganda (MRA). Hasil analisa EII dan MRA ke atas sembilan dimensi etika pendedahan 
yang terdiri daripada 80 konstruk dan 4 penentu andaian EID di kalangan bank-bank Islam menunjukkan bahawa, EID 
di kedua-dua negara adalah rendah dan pengarah bebas tidak memberi kesan kepada tahap pendedahan sosial. Walau 
bagaimanapun, saiz lembaga pengarah, lembaga penasihat syariah dan pemegang-pemegang akaun pelaburan boleh 
mempengaruhi tahap pendedahan dalam bank-bank Islam. Kesimpulannya penemuan kajian ini adalah bertentangan 
dengan teori-teori yang sedia ada seperti teori agensi dan menyokong teori institusi.
Kata kunci: Etika pendedahan identiti; penentu-penentu; bank-bank Islam; Bahrain; Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
Islamic Banks similar to conventional banks are profit-
oriented organizations that aim to gain profit. However, 
in doing so, Islamic banks must avoid interest (Riba) and 
other non-permissible activities in Islam. Hence, they are 
characterised as ethical banks which are founded on the 
precepts of Islam and operate within the Islamic business 
framework. In Islamic law on commercial transactions, 
transparency and information disclosure are the key 
determinants of a successful and peaceful contractual 
relationship. Islamic banks therefore, have the ethical 
responsibility to disclose every relevant information to 
all their stakeholders; either the customers, employees, 
regulators, shareholders or for the society at large for the 
purpose of making an informed decision regarding their 
stakes in the bank or its relationship with its business 
environment.
Kayed and Hassan (2011) further implied that having 
adequate and consistent disclosure is necessary for the 
Islamic banking industry to remain relatively positive 
and resilient. To ensure financial stability of Islamic 
financial system, Islamic banks need to ensure that their 
transparency is proper and consistent especially with 
regard to their ethical identity as Islamic institution. 
They have to ensure that their activities are in line with 
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Shari’ah principles since Shari’ah is the main component 
and the foremost salient feature in Islamic banks, which 
differentiate them from conventional banks. Such features 
include the prohibition of interest and the use of profit 
sharing investment. Failure to comply with the Shari’ah 
may lead to the losses to the Islamic banks themselves 
since they might not be able to recognize the income 
(IFSB 2005). The greatest losses that they need to bear is 
the possibility of losing their investors and Investment 
Account Holders, who are mostly Muslims and, who are 
really particular about Shari’ah compliance issues and the 
ethical identity in their dealings. 
Alternatively, the banks’ abilities in maintaining its 
capital at sufficient level, as well as ability in realising 
rates of return equal to the assumed investment risk is 
a measurement to both shareholders and Investment 
Account Holders (Mohd Ariffin, Archer & Abdel Karim 
2009). These criteria are important for their evaluation and 
confidence in making decision. Lack of such confidence 
may stop any Muslim from having a business deal with 
the Islamic banks. In order to prevent the possibility of 
such incidence, proper disclosure is needed in Islamic 
banks’ financial report, which is prepared according to the 
standard that is applicable to the Islamic banks. As such, 
studies of assessing the strength of communicated ethical 
identity of Islamic banks are important since Islamic banks 
are accountable not only to the society but also to God. 
Besides, transparency in Islamic banks’ ethical identity 
is essential to the society as it is one of the approaches in 
achieving ethical and social activities of Islamic banks. For 
example, matters pertaining to Islamic banks’ products, 
financing activities and community activities.
Due to the extensive and progressive approach on 
Islamic banking and finance, the Kingdom of Bahrain is 
chosen for this study as it is known as the hub of Islamic 
banking worldwide and it represents the best practice 
of Islamic banks (Hidayat & Abduh 2012). Bahrain 
established its first Islamic banks, Bahrain Islamic Bank, 
in the year 1979 and currently having 26 Islamic banks, 
which comprise of six retail Islamic banks and twenty (20) 
wholesale Islamic banks registered under Central Bank 
of Bahrain (Central Bank of Bahrain 2012). Similarly, 
Malaysia has also observed progressive and robust 
development in Islamic banking since 1986 in order to 
serve the needs of Malaysian economy as well as enhance 
the sustainable and economic growth of Malaysia (Bank 
Negara Malaysia 2012). Therefore, by comparing the 
ethical identity disclosure of Malaysian Islamic banks with 
Bahrain Islamic bank, Malaysian Islamic banks’ position 
could be identified when compared to the pioneer of 
Islamic banking. Examining the level of ethical disclosure 
among Islamic Banks in Malaysia and Bahrain can fulfil 
the gap from previous studies where the focus had been 
more towards corporate social responsibility disclosure.
This research paper is therefore set to explore the 
concept, practices and determinants of corporate ethical 
disclosure in Islamic banks by examining and analysing 
the practices of 5 Islamic banks operating in Bahrain and 
16 Islamic banks operating in Malaysia as a collective 
sample representing the industry practice. According to 
the principles of Islamic law on commercial transactions 
and other related contractual activities, transparency and 
adequate disclosure is the fundamental determinant of a 
successful and peaceful business relationship between 
the contracting parties. However, there is no sufficient 
evidence in terms of literature to indicate what are the 
determinants or factors that can influence transparency and 
adequate social disclosure in Islamic banks that operate 
in today’s business environment. Hence, this study also 
examines the determinants of the level of ethical identity 
disclosures (board size, board independence, Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board and Investment Account Holders). 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. 
The next section reviews on relevant literature and 
hypothesis development. The third section discusses on 
sampling methodology, data collection and data analysis, 
followed by discussion on the research findings in the 
fourth section. Finally, the paper ends with summary and 
conclusion of the research.
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
Empirically, this study used corporate governance 
characteristics as a determinant in assessing the factors 
affecting the ethical disclosure of the Islamic banks. 
Specifically, the board composition, which comprises 
three perspectives, namely, board size (Said et al. 2009), 
board independence (Khan 2010; Bhasin, Makarov & 
Orazalin 2012) and Shari’ah Supervisory Board, as well 
as Investment Account Holders (Farook, Hassan & Lanis 
2011) are used to assess the ethical identity disclosure of 
Islamic banks, thus relating each variable to the theoretical 
assumptions.
BOARD SIZE
The board of directors is one of the important elements 
in corporate governance and is responsible in supervising 
and overseeing the organisation as to ensure that it is 
being properly managed by the management. According 
to Jensen (1993), the larger the number of board members, 
the more ineffective the communication and coordination 
of the board and the more likely it is controlled by the 
CEO. This argument is supported by the agency theory, 
which proposes that large board can be costly to the 
organization due to increase in the potential conflict and 
operational complexity among board members, which lead 
to poor decision making (Lipton & Lorsch 1992; Jensen 
1993). Ning, Davidson and Wang (2010) suggested that 
an increase in board size would likely cause an increase 
in agency problems, which would contribute to internal 
conflict as well as the free-riding problem among the 
directors. Said et al. (2009) also acknowledged that 
ineffective communication and inefficiency in decision-
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making would lead to low quality disclosure in financial 
reporting since the board members are not able to perform 
their roles efficiently.
However, Clemente and Labat (2009) claimed that 
large board size would increase the monitoring capabilities 
of the board. Due to a significant relationship between the 
organization and their stakeholders, they tend to increase 
their disclosure level and release more information, 
as suggested by the stakeholder theory. In a study by 
Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain and Yao (2009), they found 
that board size is a significant predictor of the voluntary 
disclosure in Malaysian listed firms, as they found that 
large board size produced a greater level of voluntary 
disclosure. Moreover, in Rouf (2011), who studied how 
corporate characteristics and governance attributes would 
affect the voluntary disclosure in Bangladeshi firms, found 
there is a significantly positive relationship between board 
size and voluntarily disclosure. In a study concerning 
the impact of corporate governance on social and 
environmental information disclosure in Malaysian banks 
by Htay, Abd Rashid, Adnan and Mydin Meera (2012), it 
was found that board size has a positive significant impact 
on the social and environmental information disclosure. 
This is because large board size seems to produce a better 
effect on the disclosure in the banking sector. Thus, based 
on the stakeholder theory, this study expects that there is 
a positive relationship between board size and disclosure 
level, which leads to the hypothesis which states:  
H1a There is a positive significant relationship between 
board size and ethical identity disclosure.
BOARD INDEPENDENCE
In Jensen and Meckling (1976), according to the agency 
theory, boards need to be observed and supervised by 
another party because of the nature of their opportunistic 
behaviour. As the decision experts, independent directors 
are suitable to take the role of monitoring and controlling 
the management performance since they have to be 
professional and have a positive influence over the 
director’s decision (Fama & Jensen 1983; Hermalin & 
Weisbach 1988). Lim, Matolcsy and Chow (2007) found 
that independent directors would influence the disclosure 
level of firms concerning corporate information, as they 
play a role in the decision making process at the board 
level. On the other hand, Ho and Wong (2001) found no 
significant association between board independence and 
disclosure due to the low level of compliance in Chinese 
firms even with the presence of independent directors. 
This is also supported by the findings of Mohd Ghazali 
and Weetman (2006) who found that board independence 
has no significant relationship with voluntary disclosure 
as the existence of independent directors on the board of 
directors could not influence the voluntary disclosure of 
Malaysian listed companies.
The findings from Mohd Ghazali (2007) showed that 
board independence is significantly positive towards the 
disclosure level of the organization, which is consistent 
with the suggestion by the agency theory that claims that 
involvement from the board of directors is necessary in 
order to monitor any self-interest activities by managers. 
In addition, this theory suggests that a high proportion 
of independent directors will be able to monitor any 
self-interest action by the management; and, thus, may 
encourage the management to disclose more information 
(Williams, Duncan, Ginter & Shewchuk 2006). This 
is consistent with the study by Bhasin et al. (2012) 
who examined the voluntary disclosure determinants 
in the banking sector of Kazakhstan, and found that 
board composition has a positive significant impact on 
the voluntary disclosure by Kazakhstan banks. This is 
supported by the findings by Htay, Ab. Rashid, Adnan and 
Mydin Meera (2011) who found that independent directors 
are one of the significant factors affecting the voluntary 
disclosure in Malaysian listed banks as they can provide 
more sources of information to the dependent directors. 
Consequently, based on the stakeholder and agency 
theory, this study expects that Malaysian and Bahrain 
Islamic banks tend to disclose more information on ethical 
identity with the presence of independent directors as 
board members:
H1b There is a positive significant relationship between 
board independence and ethical identity disclosure
SHARI’AH SUPERVISORY BOARD
This study includes the Shari’ah Supervisory Board, as the 
board is one of the corporate elements in Islamic banks, 
and is considered as crucial to the level of disclosure in 
Islamic banks. The Shari’ah Supervisory Board is a unique 
element in the governance of Islamic banks. In Scott 
(2005), he explained that the institutional theory is a kind 
of social structure that has been set up as an authoritative 
guideline, which consists of schemes, norms and routine, 
to structure the social behaviour. Based on this theory, 
Farook et al. (2011) and Khan et al. (2015) mentioned 
that the Shari’ah Supervisory Board institution plays a 
vital role in ensuring that the activities of Islamic banks 
harmonize with Shari’ah ethics and principles. As the 
institution that governs Islamic banks, the Shari’ah board 
is responsible for guiding and controlling the behaviour 
of organizations so that the interests of society can be 
protected. Karim (1990) stressed in his paper that the 
authority of the Shari’ah Supervisory Board is equal to 
other conventional auditors since they need to ‘investigate’ 
whether the Islamic banks adhere to Islamic ethics and 
Shari’ah principles. According to Farook et al. (2011), the 
nature of Shari’ah compliance is not only based on the 
assurance of compliance through the Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board report but also on the greater involvement in social 
activities as well as the social disclosure. Thus, it is 
expected that the existence of the Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board in the governance of Islamic bank would lead to 
greater disclosure level of the Islamic bank itself.
Bab 2.indd   15 8/25/2016   4:02:56 PM
16 Jurnal Pengurusan 46
Farook et al. (2011) also stated that the higher the 
number of the members of the Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board, the greater the disclosure level of Islamic banks 
since the ability of the Shari’ah Supervisory Board to 
monitor the Islamic banks governance also increases. 
Their study, which examines the Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board as one of the factors that may influence the 
corporate social responsibility disclosure in Islamic banks, 
found that the Shari’ah Supervisory Board is the most 
significant factor that affects the level of corporate social 
disclosure. Similarly, Abdul Rahman and Awadh Bukair 
(2013) found that the combination of Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board attributes has a significant positive influence on 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure among 
Islamic Banks of Gulf Co-Operation Council Countries. 
In examining Shari’ah disclosures among Malaysian and 
Indonesian Islamic Banks, Wan Abdullah et al. (2013) 
found that the extent of disclosure on Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board is associated with the cross-membership with other 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board and the expertise of Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board members in accounting, banking, 
economics or finance.
As suggested by institutional theory, the Shari’ah 
Supervisory institution plays an important role in 
influencing the level of disclosure of Islamic banks, as 
they are a part of the Shari’ah governance, which governs 
the Shari’ah matters in Islamic banks. Hence, applying 
institutional theory, this study proposes that disclosure is 
positively related to the Shari’ah Supervisory Board of 
Islamic banks, which can be formulated in the following 
hypothesis: 
H1c There is a positive significant relationship between 
the Shari’ah Supervisory Board and ethical identity 
disclosure.
INVESTMENT ACCOUNT HOLDERS
Farook et al. (2011) argued that Muslim investors would 
prefer to make an investment as investment account 
holders rather than invest their funds as shareholders. 
This is because they are usually interested in the services 
offered by Islamic banks compared to the share ownership 
of that particular bank. However, Archer and Karim (1998) 
argued with regard to agency theory, the form of profit 
sharing loss contract used by Islamic banks in managing 
and mobilizing the investment account holder’s fund might 
lead to agency problems. Since Islamic banks act as the 
agent of the shareholders as well as for the Investment 
Account Holders, this relationship would increase the 
possibility of having a conflict of interest in dealing 
with the investment account holders’ funds (Archer et 
al. 1998). Pertaining to the Islamic banks risk, Shari’ah 
compliance is one of the important elements in Islamic 
banks. Therefore, the investment account holders might 
face the risk of non-compliance with Shari’ah, which 
may contribute to the agency problem in Islamic banks 
when the banks fail to meet the obligation of Shari’ah 
principles (Bank Negara Malaysia 2010). Therefore, in 
order to solve these agency problems, adequate disclosure 
of reporting information, especially information with 
regard to the Shari’ah compliance, might reduce the 
occurrence of agency problem among the investment 
account holders since they have enough information to 
assess the risk (Karim 2001). 
Karim (1990) also stated that in the context of the 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board report, if Islamic banks are 
going to publish a negative report, the group of investment 
account holders would begin to doubt the management’s 
commitment towards Shari’ah and they may start to 
avoid dealing with that particular Islamic bank. As the 
investment account holders are more interested in the 
Shari’ah compliance issues in the Islamic banks, the 
presence of investment account holders could have greater 
influence concerning the extent of disclosure. Further, in a 
study by Farook et al. (2011), which examines investment 
account holders as one of the factors that may influence 
corporate social responsibility disclosure in Islamic banks, 
found that investment account holders are among the 
significant factors that affect the level of corporate social 
disclosure. This is consistent with the stakeholder theory 
that claims the responsibility of Islamic banks towards 
the investment account holders. As investment account 
holders are the backbone in the operation of Islamic 
banks, the banks should strive to meet and maintain the 
expectation of the investment account holders through 
ethical identity disclosure. Thus, the final proposition on 
the relationship between the investment account holder 
and ethical identity disclosure level could be hypothesised 
as below:
H2 There is a positive significant relationship between 
investment account holders and ethical identity 
disclosure.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The sample size of this study consists of 16 Malaysian 
Islamic banks and 5 retail Islamic banks operating in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain, totalling 21 Islamic banks. The 
main source of data for this study is the corporate social 
disclosure information published in the annual reports 
of the banks for the period of 5 consecutive years from 
2007 to 2011. The study used content analysis to identify 
the items for measuring the corporate social disclosure 
practices of Islamic banks. The items and categories 
for the research instrument chosen take into account the 
disclosure requirement by the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI, 
1997) as used in similar studies by Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2007), and Zubairu et al. (2011). Data collected was 
analysed using Ethical Identity Index (EII) comprising of 
nine dimensions of disclosure namely; vision and mission 
statement, board of directors and top management, product, 
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zakat, charity and benevolent loan, employees, debtors, 
community, environment and Shari’ah Supervisory Board. 
The possible total score obtained by each bank amounts 
to 80 points.
Conceptually, there are three types of variables in 
this study namely; independent, dependent and control 
variables. The independent variables are: 
1. Board size measured according to the number of 
directors on the board (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009), 
2. Board independence measured by looking at the 
percentage of independent directors to the total 
number of directors (Chau & Gray 2010; Huafang 
& Jianguo 2007), 
3. Shari’ah Supervisory Board measured by looking at 
the number of members on the Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board (Farook et al. 2011) and 
4. Investment Account Holders (IAH) measured by 
dividing the IAH funds to the paid up capital in 
shareholders’ equity (Farook et al. 2011). 
Ethical Identity Disclosure (EID) is the dependent 
variable. While bank size is measured based on the 
logarithm of total assets of the banks at the end of 
the reporting year (Fungacova & Weill 2009), banks’ 
profitability measured through the return on equity (ROE) 
of the Islamic banks (Berger & Black 2011) and country, 
measured using dummy values (0 Malaysia, 1 Bahrain) 
are the control variables. The usage of country as a control 
variable was similarly used in study by Bashir (2001).
Two analytical models namely; Ethical Identity 
Index (EII) Multiple Regression Analysis (MRA) will be 
used in determining the disclosure level of corporate 
social disclosure and identifying the factors that 
determine  corporate ethical identity in Islamic banks 
respectively. Similar to the studies by Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2007), Zubairu, Sakariyau, and Dauda (2011) EII is 
computed as follows:
Model 1: 
	 	 ∑Xij
 EIIj =
  nj
Where EIIj = Ethical Identity Index
 Xij = 1 if ith construct is disclosed, 0 if ith 
   construct is not disclosed
 nj = Number of constructs to be disclosed by 
   banks
The MRA equation is as below: 
MRA Equation:
CSD = β0+ β1BSIZE + β2BINDE+ +β3SSB + β4IAH + 
β5SIZE+ β6PROFIT+ β7COUN+ ε
Where:
EID = Corporate Social Disclosure
BSIZE = Board’s size
BINDE = Board’s independence
SSB = Shari’ah Supervisory Board
IAH = Investment Account Holder
SIZE = Banks’ size
PROFIT = Banks’ profit
Βi = Parameter to be estimated
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
ε	 =	 Error	term
RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
ANALYSIS OF EID PRACTICES
Table 1 presents the ethical identity disclosure (EID) index 
for nine dimensions for both the Malaysian and Bahrain 
Islamic banks. It shows that the overall disclosure for 
ethical identity for both countries is only 51.7%, which 
suggests that there is low level of disclosure for both 
countries. Further, it can be seen that the disclosure of 
Bahrain Islamic banks is significantly higher (56.4%) 
than that of the Malaysian Islamic banks (47%). However, 
even though the level of disclosure of the Bahrain banks 
is greater than that of the Malaysian banks, it is still 
low as both countries only disclosed about 50% of the 
disclosure requirements. The Table also illustrates that 
TABLE 1. Ethical identity disclosure index
Ethical Identity Index Malaysia Bahrain Total Mean Sig.
Vision and mission statement 47.1% 56% 51.6% 0.001
BOD and top management 62% 76.6% 69.3% 0.000
Product 36.8% 53.6% 45.2% 0.000
Zakāt, charity and benevolent loans 30.1% 49.8% 39.9% 0.000
Employees 62.5% 75% 68.8% 0.000
Debtors 84.4% 71% 77.7% 0.000
Community 38.3% 76.7% 57.5% 0.000
Environment 13.2% 0% 6.6% 0.005
Shari’ah Supervisory Board 49% 48.7% 48.8% 0.914 
Total 47% 56.4% 51.7% 0.000
Source: Research Data Analysis 
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the most communicated dimension by both banks is the 
debtors’ dimension (77.7%) followed by board of directors 
and top management dimension (69.3%). While the least 
communicated dimension is the environmental dimension 
with 6.6% of disclosure. This implies that neither country 
prioritises environmental issues, which, perhaps, is 
because they considered that environmental issues are not 
influenced by their operations.
The results further indicated that the Malaysian and 
Bahrain Islamic banks need to improve their disclosure on 
vision and mission statement, product, Zakāt, charity and 
benevolent loans, community, environment and Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board dimension, since the level of disclosure 
for these dimensions is either below or around 50%. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Table 2 shows that, on average, most of the Islamic banks 
in Malaysia and Bahrain employed about seven to eight 
members as the members of the board of directors, which 
is an optimal number for the board, as having more than 
that would interfere with the group dynamics (Jensen 
1993). As for the board’s independence (BINDE), the mean 
is 50.14%, which means that half of the board of directors 
in Islamic banks consist of independent directors. 
This indicates that the banks have met the corporate 
governance requirements for Islamic banks. For Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board (SSB), the results indicate that most 
Shari’ah Supervisory Boards in Islamic banks consist 
of four members. This shows that both countries have 
complied with the regulators’ requirement. Finally, 
the mean for investment account holders of 1626.69% 
implies that most of the investment account holders in 
Islamic banks are about sixteen times more than the paid 
up capital of the Islamic banks.
CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Table 3 below indicated there is a negative significant 
correlation between the board size and investment account 
holders where r is -0.377 at 1% significance level. This 
medium relationship indicates that a larger board size 
would reduce the investment account holders. Table 3 also 
illustrates that there is a positive significant correlation 
between board independence and investment account 
holders, which has a medium strength of relationship, 
as r is 0.304 at 1% significance. This shows that a large 
proportion of independent directors would increase the 
number of investment account holders.
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics of ethical identity disclosure determinants
 Malaysian Islamic Banks Bahrain Islamic Banks Total
Determinants Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Sig
BSIZE (No of member) 7.53 1.646 8.68 1.773 7.8 0.003
BINDE (%) 50.63% 0.133788 48.56% 0.223694 50.14% 0.571
SSB (No of member) 4.20 1.152 4.04 0.935 4.16 0.529
IAH (%) 2001.67% 31.838083 426.73% 3.635097 1626.69% 0.016
Source: Research Data Analysis
Notes: EID is Ethical Identity Disclosure. 
 BSIZE is Board Size 
 BINDE is Board Independence. 
 SSB is Shari’ah Supervisory Board. 
 IAH is Investment Account Holder.
TABLE 3. Pearson correlation coefficient
 BSIZE BINDE SSB IAH SIZE PROFIT COUN
BSIZE 1
BINDE -0.023 1
SSB 0.002 0.031 1
IAH -0.377** 0.304** -0.033 1
SIZE -0.275** 0.240* 0.336** 0.439** 1
PROFIT 0.126 0.096 0.019 0.007 -0.137 1
COUN 0.284** -0.056 -0.062 -0.236* -0.809** 0.171 1
Source:  Research Data Analysis
Notes:  ** Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed).
 *   Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed).
 EID is Ethical Identity Disclosure. 
 BSIZE is Board Size 
 BINDE is Board Independence. 
 SSB is Shari’ah Supervisory Board.
 IAH is Investment Account Holder.
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MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Before running the multiple linear regression analysis, 
we tested the data for normality and multicollinearity. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that the data 
is not normally distributed. However, according to 
Pallant (2010), it is common for large sample size to be 
abnormally distributed, through which the data violates 
the assumption of normality; however, it will not cause 
any serious problem. In addition, according to the Central 
Limit Theorem, when the sample size is large, more than 
30 per group, the sampling distribution will take a normal 
distribution shape, regardless of the population shape from 
which the sample is drawn (Field 2009).
Table 4 tabulates the results for the Multiple Linear 
Regression analysis that examines the determinants for 
EID. The Durbin-Watson value shows 1.710. This implies 
that there is no presence of auto-correlation, thereby 
indicating data independence between the independent 
variable and EID. 
TABLE 4. Multiple linear regression analysis: Determinants 
of ethical identity
Model Coefficients t-value p-value
(Constant)  -2.855 *** 0.005 
BSIZE 0.196 2.509 ** 0.014
BINDE 0.025 0.333  0.740
SSB 0.284 3.320 *** 0.001
IAH 0.235 2.397 *** 0.008
SIZE 0.609 3.667 *** 0.000
PROFIT -0.054 -0.748  0.456
COUN 0.897 6.326 *** 0.000
R2  0.529 
Adjusted  R2  0.495
F-value  15.541
p-value  0.000
Durbin-Watson  1.710
N  105 
Notes: *** P-value is significant at the 0.01 level
 ** P-value is significant at the 0.05 level
 Dependent variable - EID is Ethical Identity Disclosure. 
 Independent variables - BSIZE (Board Size), BINDE (Board 
Independence), SSB   (Shari’ah Supervisory Board) & IAH (Investment 
Account Holder)
 Control variables – SIZE (Banks’ Size), PROFIT (Banks’ Profit) & COUN 
(Country)
Table 4 highlights that there is a positive significant 
relationship between board size (BSIZE) and EID of Islamic 
banks, in which the t-value is 2.509 at 5% significance 
level; thus accepting hypothesis H1a. Our findings is 
supported by Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), Rouf (2011) 
and Htay et al. (2012) who found a positive relationship 
between board size and voluntary disclosure, which 
suggests that a large board will ensure more EID compared 
to a smaller board. Our findings are also consistent with 
the stakeholder theory, which claims that the Islamic banks 
tend to increase their disclosure level and release more 
information concerning their operations and activities due 
to the significant relationship between Islamic banks and 
their stakeholders. Therefore, having a large number of 
board members would increase the level of disclosure in 
Islamic banks, which helps the board to satisfy the needs 
of the stakeholders as also claimed by Clemente and Labat 
(2009). This result implies that board size is one of the 
important determinants of EID in Bahrain and Malaysian 
Islamic banks as it plays a significant role in influencing 
the disclosure of the ethical identity by the banks. The 
existing size of 7 and 9 board members in Malaysian and 
Bahrain Islamic banks respectively are considered large 
enough to influence dynamic decision making. Further 
observation indicates that most of the Islamic banks in 
Malaysia and Bahrain that have a high-level of disclosure 
are those banks with large board size.
However, as indicated in Table 4, hypothesis H1b 
is rejected as the results show there is no significant 
relationship between the proportion of independent 
members on the board of directors and EID. This finding 
is in contrast with agency theory that suggests that to 
influence decision making as well as monitor and control 
the opportunistic behaviour of management and other 
board members, independent directors need to be among 
the board members. This is because, besides incentives, 
effective monitoring is one of the mechanisms that was 
proposed to minimise the agency problem that occurs in 
organisations by Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, 
the results corroborate the findings of Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006), and Khodadadi, Khazami and Aflatooni 
(2010), as the authors found no significant relationship 
between board independence and voluntary disclosure 
in Malaysia and Iranian listed firms. This is supported 
by other findings from Haniffa and Cooke (2002), as 
they found that the proportion of independent directors 
could not influence the level of disclosure due to the 
ineffective monitoring role by the directors. Hence, the 
issue that needs to be addressed in the findings of this 
study concerns the independence of independent directors 
as well as their monitoring effectiveness, as most of them 
are appointed and paid by the bank’s chairman or CEOs, 
their influences are limited. The data collected also show 
that the proportion of independent directors is similar for 
most of the banks, and that even banks with the highest 
and lowest disclosure level are a bit different in terms of 
their proportion of independent directors.
Similar to the studies by Farook et al. (2011), 
the regression results in Table 4 further indicate that 
there is a significant positive relationship between 
the Shari’ah Supervisory Board and ethical identity 
disclosure in Malaysian and Bahrain Islamic banks and 
the relationship; thus hypothesis H1c is accepted. This 
finding is consistent with the institutional theory that 
suggests that to ensure the organisation is successful in 
achieving its goals and objectives, the organisations’ 
corporate governance mechanism must be effective. The 
institutions’ Shari’ah Supervisory Board is responsible for 
guiding and controlling the conduct and performance of 
the Islamic banks to ensure that the interests of society are 
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protected. Thus, the existence of the Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board members may result in greater governance and 
monitoring, and, consequently, greater compliance with 
Shari’ah principles by the Islamic banks. Increasing 
the level of integrity of the Shari’ah Supervisory Board 
may increase the level of confidence of Muslim society, 
especially Muslim investors towards the Islamic financial 
institution.
Similar to the study by Farook et al. (2011), further 
analysis in this study shows that investment account 
holders (IAH) have a significant positive relationship 
with ethical identity disclosure in Malaysian and Bahrain 
Islamic banks; thus, hypothesis H2 is accepted. This 
finding is consistent with the stakeholder theory, whereby 
having greater monitoring by the investment account 
holders as one of the stakeholders is needed in the Islamic 
banks to ensure that the investment account holders are 
managed and mobilised appropriately by the banks. As the 
Islamic banks need to act as the agent to the investment 
account holders as well as to the shareholder, the conflict 
of interest or agency problem would arise. Therefore, the 
presence of monitoring from investment account holders 
may reduce the agency problem, and, thus, influence 
the management of Islamic banks pertaining to the 
compliance and disclosure issues (Archer et al. 1998). The 
investment account holders’ influence may apply more 
pressure on the management of Islamic banks to disclose 
more information as required by the regulators. Thus, by 
disclosing the ethical identity information, it may establish 
a connection with the Muslim investor.
CONCLUSION
From the ethical identity index model, we can see that the 
overall disclosure level in both countries is 51.6%, which 
suggests a low level of disclosure by both countries, since 
they only disclose 50% of their total expected disclosure. 
In addition, the overall disclosure shows that the disclosure 
level of Bahrain Islamic banks is significantly higher 
(56.4%) than Malaysian Islamic banks (47.1%). The 
results further indicate that the information in the vision 
and mission statement; product; Zakat, charity and 
benevolent loans; community; environment; and Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board dimensions need to be emphasised 
by the regulators as well as the Islamic banks as they are 
among the least communicated activities by both banks. 
This needs to be emphasised by both the management 
and the regulators of Islamic banks because if these 
dimensions are not adequately disclosed, it could have a 
severe impact on the image of Islamic banks as ethical and 
Islamic financial institutions. The management of Islamic 
financial institutions have the upmost duty to improve 
their disclosure level to provide a deeper assurance to the 
stakeholders on the institutions’ Shari’ah compliance in 
all aspects of their products, instruments, operations and 
practices. Moving towards a more transparent disclosure 
would also require more proactive involvement of 
regulators as the results in this study have shown that the 
respective institutions will only abide with the minimum 
requirement as provided by the regulators.
Further analysis suggests that independent directors 
of Islamic banks in both Malaysia and Bahrain cannot 
really influence the management when it comes to 
ethical identity disclosures regardless of their number. 
Meanwhile, the Shari’ah Supervisory Board members 
are found to be the most significant factor that could 
influence the level of ethical identity disclosure in 
Islamic banks. This is consistent with the idea suggested 
by the institutional theory in which the Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board is one of the significant means of 
governance in Islamic banks to supervise and control 
the Islamic banks’ activities and performance and ensure 
that they conform to the Shari’ah principles (Farook 
et al. 2011). Thus, the current findings show that the 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board plays a critical role in 
influencing the level of ethical identity disclosure in 
Islamic banks as they could govern the Islamic banks 
effectively with their expertise. Furthermore, the result 
of this study implies that investment account holders 
are among the monitoring mechanisms that can be used 
to enhance disclosure level and transparency among 
Islamic banks. This is in line with stakeholder theory, as 
investment account holders could be a good monitoring 
tool in observing the activities of Islamic banks. After 
all, their huge amount of deposits can serve as a control 
mechanism to force the Islamic banks to comply with 
Shari’ah and other ethical requirement. Since Muslim 
investors are more likely to invest their funds in Shari’ah-
compliant investments, Islamic banks need to carefully 
manage their operations and ensure that everything is in 
accordance with Shari’ah law.
Finally, this study also found that the size of the board 
has a significant influence on the level of ethical identity 
disclosure in Islamic banks. This is consistent with the 
stakeholder theory and findings of Clemente and Labat 
(2009), which claimed that the larger the board size, the 
greater the level of disclosure in Islamic banks; thus more 
stakeholders’ needs as well as expectations could be 
fulfilled by the Islamic banks. However, there are many 
aspects of this study that could be explored in future 
research. As this study used secondary data in examining 
the level of disclosure in Islamic banks, future research 
may consider using other methodological approaches, 
other forms of media as well as improving the research 
instruments by adding any other aspects that could be used 
in examining the ethical identity disclosure in Islamic 
banks. Future studies could also consider comparing 
the determinants for both countries and identify which 
determinants would be more important under different 
Islamic governance settings.
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APPENDIX A
List of Sampled Islamic Banks in Malaysia and Bahrain
  Islamic Banks in Malaysia  Islamic Banks in Bahrain
 No. Bank Name No. Bank Name
 1 Affin Islamic Bank Berhad 1 Al Baraka Islamic Bank B.S.C.
 2 Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Co. Berhad
 3 Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad 2 Al-Salam Bank -Bahrain B.S.C.
 4 AmIslamic Bank Berhad
 5 Asian Finance Bank Berhad 3 Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 
 6 Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
 7 Bank Mu’amalat Malaysia Berhad 4 Khaleeji Commercial Bank B.S.C.
 8 CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad
 9 Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad 5 Kuwait Finance House (Bahrain) B.S.C. © 
 10 HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad
 11 Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad
 12 Maybank Islamic Berhad
 13 OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad
 14 Public Islamic Bank Berhad
 15 RHB Islamic Bank Berhad
 16 Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia and Central Bank of Bahrain
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